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OPINION 
_____________________ 
 
SMITH, Chief Judge 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) criminalizes using, carrying, or 
possessing a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. 
The First Step Act reduced the mandatory minimum sentence 
for first-time offenders who commit multiple § 924(c) counts 
charged in the same indictment. The new minimum applies to 
defendants convicted before the Act became law if they had 
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not yet had a sentence “imposed.” See First Step Act of 2018, 
§ 403, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5221-22.  
In 2014, Richard Hodge, Jr. was charged in the District 
of the Virgin Islands with three § 924(c) counts after he shot 
two armored-vehicle workers and stole $33,500. A jury 
convicted Hodge of two § 924(c) counts, along with several 
other federal and territorial crimes.1 In 2015, the District Court 
sentenced Hodge to an aggregate 420 months imprisonment on 
the two § 924(c) counts—the pre–First Step Act mandatory 
minimum for first-time § 924(c) offenders convicted of two 
counts involving discharging a firearm—plus another 310 
months on the other counts. We affirmed the District Court’s 
judgment of sentence on the federal counts, but remanded the 
territorial charges with instructions to vacate two territorial 
counts and to conduct the “requisite resentencing.” See 870 
F.3d 184, 188 (3d Cir. 2017). Before resentencing took place, 
the First Step Act became law. The Act amended § 924(c) so 
that first-time offenders convicted of two § 924(c) counts 
involving discharging a firearm and stemming from the same 
indictment now face a 240-month mandatory minimum.2 
                                                 
1 Under 48 U.S.C. § 1612(c), the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands not only has jurisdiction over federal offenses, but also 
has pendent jurisdiction over territorial offenses arising from 
the same criminal activity. 
2 More specifically, the First Step Act eliminated § 
924(c)(1)(C)’s “stacking” requirement for first-time offenders. 
Under either version of § 924(c), a first-time offender 
convicted of discharging a firearm faces a 120-month 
mandatory minimum on his first § 924(c) count. See § 
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We must decide whether the District Court’s post–First 
Step Act modification of Hodge’s territorial sentence allows 
Hodge to invoke the reduced § 924(c) mandatory minimum. 
Given the limited nature of our remand, the District Court did 
not think so, and he declined to disturb Hodge’s federal 
sentence. As a matter of decretal interpretation, that was the 
correct result.3 And as a matter of statutory interpretation, we 
                                                 
924(c)(1)(A)(iii). But before the First Step Act, if that offender 
was convicted of a second § 924(c) count, he faced an 
enhanced consecutive 300-month mandatory recidivist 
penalty—even though both counts came from the same 
indictment. See § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (amended 2018) (“In the case 
of a second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, the 
person shall [] be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not 
less than 25 years . . . .” (emphasis added)); § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii); 
see also Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993). After 
the First Step Act, when a first-time offender who discharged 
a firearm is convicted of multiple § 924(c) counts from the 
same indictment, each count carries only the standard 120-
month minimum, run consecutively. See § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (“In 
the case of a violation of this subsection that occurs after a 
prior conviction under this subsection has become final, the 
person shall [] be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not 
less than 25 years . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
3 Our prior opinion explicitly “affirm[ed] the District Court’s 
judgment of conviction and sentence on” Hodge’s federal 
charges, including his § 924(c) counts. 870 F.3d at 206. Only 
Hodge’s territorial sentence remained at issue on remand. The 
jury convicted Hodge of three territorial firearms offenses 
arising from the same conduct, but we concluded territorial law 
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hold the new § 924(c) mandatory minimum does not apply to 
defendants initially sentenced before the First Step Act’s 
enactment. We will therefore affirm. 
I 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231 and 48 U.S.C. § 1612(c). We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. We review statutory interpretation questions de 
novo. See Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York Cty. Prison, 905 
F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 
                                                 
permitted only one. See id. at 197-99. So we “affirm[ed] the 
District Court’s judgment and commitment” on the territorial 
charges, “except that we [] remand[ed] to the District Court to 
vacate two of the three [territorial firearms] offenses.” Id. at 
206. Given this express direction, had the District Court taken-
up Hodge’s call to revisit his federal sentence, it would have 
impermissibly “deviate[d] from the mandate issued by an 
appellate court.” Briggs v. Pa. R.R. Co., 334 U.S. 304, 306 
(1948). See generally Sibbald v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 
Pet.) 488, 492 (1838) (“Whatever was before the [appellate] 
Court, and is disposed of, is considered as finally settled. The 
inferior court is bound by the decree as the law of the case; and 
must carry it into execution, according to the mandate. They 
cannot vary it, nor examine it for any other purpose than 
execution; or give any other or further relief; . . . or intermeddle 
with it, further than to settle so much as has been remanded.”). 
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II 
Hodge argues that any defendant awaiting resentencing 
when the First Step Act became law may benefit from the 
reduced § 924(c) mandatory minimum. But the First Step Act’s 
text and our decision in United States v. Aviles, 938 F.3d 503 
(3d Cir. 2019), suggest otherwise. Because the District Court 
first sentenced Hodge before the First Step Act became law, he 
cannot benefit from its changes to § 924(c). And that’s true 
even though the District Court revisited other aspects of his 
sentence after the First Step Act’s passage.  
A 
We start with the statutory text. Recall that when a 
statute imposes a newer, more lenient penalty, the change 
applies retroactively only if Congress intends it to. See Dorsey 
v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 272 (2012) (citing 1 U.S.C. § 
109). In the First Step Act, Congress spoke unequivocally: the 
reduced § 924(c) mandatory minimum would apply 
retroactively “to any offense that was committed before the 
date of enactment of this Act, if a sentence for the offense has 
not been imposed as of [that] date.” § 403(b), 132 Stat. at 5222. 
So the First Step Act conditions the reduced mandatory 
minimum’s retroactive application on the imposition of a 
sentence—not the sentence, an ultimate sentence, or a final 
sentence. That word choice matters. For starters, Congress 
knows how to say such things when it wants to. See, e.g., 18 
U.S.C. § 3742 (discussing grounds to appeal “an otherwise 
final sentence”); cf. Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 491-
92 (1994) (rejecting a possible reading of a statutory provision 
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since Congress specifically provided for that reading in more 
specific language elsewhere). 
What’s more, the immediately preceding subsection of 
the First Step Act—the provision amending § 924(c)—
discusses sentence finality. See § 403(a), 132 Stat. at 5221-22 
(“Section 924(c)(1)(C) of title 18, United States Code, is 
amended, in the matter preceding clause (i), by striking ‘second 
or subsequent conviction under this subsection’ and inserting 
‘violation of this subsection that occurs after a prior conviction 
under this subsection has become final.’” (emphasis added)). 
But as discussed, the very next subsection limiting that 
amendment’s retroactive application focuses only on sentence 
imposition. See § 403(b), 132 Stat. at 5222 (“This section, and 
the amendments made by this section, shall apply to any 
offense that was committed before the date of enactment of this 
Act, if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of 
such date of enactment.” (emphasis added)). 
So for Hodge to win, we would have to equate § 403(b) 
with finality even though it makes no mention of finality, and 
even though § 403(a) expressly discusses finality. But “[w]e 
refrain from concluding here that the differing language in the 
two subsections has the same meaning in each.” Russello v. 
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983). Rather, we conclude the 
First Step Act intentionally subjected any defendant who 
already had any sentence imposed to the original § 924(c) 
mandatory minimum, even if their sentence was subsequently 
modified. And so Hodge—who the District Court initially 
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sentenced before the First Step Act became law—cannot be the 
beneficiary of any clemency intended by the Act.4 
B 
And then there is Aviles. That case interprets § 401(c) 
of the First Step Act, which similarly limits retroactively 
applying a reduced penalty—this time under the Controlled 
Substances Act and the Controlled Substances Import and 
Export Act—by excluding cases where a sentence was already 
imposed. See 938 F.3d at 510. We agreed with the Seventh 
Circuit that a sentence is “‘“imposed” . . . within the meaning 
of’” the First Step Act once “a sentencing order has been 
entered by a district court.” Id. (quoting United States v. 
Pierson, 925 F.3d 913, 927-28 (7th Cir. 2019)). The Sixth and 
D.C. Circuits have also adopted that position. See Young v. 
United States, 943 F.3d 460, 463 (D.C. Cir. 2019); United 
States v. Wiseman, 932 F.3d 411, 417 (6th Cir. 2019). 
We decline to give the word “impose” in § 403(b) a 
different meaning than we gave it in § 401(c). After all, 
“identical words used in different parts of the same statute are 
generally presumed to have the same meaning.” IBP, Inc. v. 
Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005). So Aviles buttresses our 
textual analysis: Hodge cannot leverage the reduced § 924(c) 
mandatory minimum on remand because the District Court 
                                                 
4 Because we resolve only the issue presented, we express no 
opinion as to whether § 403 applies to a defendant whose 
sentence on § 924(c) counts is vacated and remanded for 
resentencing after the Act’s enactment. See Aviles, 938 F.3d at 
515 n.8 (leaving this question open). 
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already imposed a sentence upon him before the First Step Act 
became law. That’s true even though the District Court 
modified other aspects of his sentence after passage of the First 
Step Act. 
III 
With his primary argument thwarted by both statutory 
text and Aviles, Hodge is left with his back-up request for a 
remand under 28 U.S.C. § 2106. Section 2106 allows us to 
“affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, 
decree, or order of a court” and “remand the cause and direct 
the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order . . . as 
may be just under the circumstances.” Hodge contends it 
would be “unjust” to impose the § 924(c) mandatory minimum 
in effect at the time of his original sentencing since “the law 
changed drastically” while he awaited resentencing. Appellant 
Br. 21. 
We disagree. If anything, fairness considerations 
underscore our legal conclusion. After all, “reduction[s] in 
criminal penalties” will always “pose difficult line-drawing in 
applying the reduction to pending cases.” Pierson, 925 F.3d at 
927. But drawing the line at initial-sentence imposition is 
preferable to drawing the line at ultimate-sentence imposition. 
If we let all defendants awaiting resentencing capitalize on the 
First Step Act, we would favor defendants whose appeals—for 
whatever reason—took longer to resolve. 
Imagine two § 924(c) defendants sentenced before the 
First Step Act who successfully appeal their sentences. 
Suppose the first defendant homes-in on a single dispositive 
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issue, allowing vacatur and resentencing before the First Step 
Act’s passage. But suppose the second defendant complicates 
his appeal with multiple yet non-meritorious issues, delaying 
resentencing until after the First Step Act passes. The first 
defendant would not benefit from the new mandatory 
minimum, but the second defendant would. We should not 
countenance such a result. Focusing on initial-sentence 
imposition avoids that disparity. 
IV 
For these reasons, we will affirm Hodge’s sentence. 
